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DISMANTLING DEMOCRACY: COMMON




In this symposium issue, Professors Joo, Ghosh, Ledwon,
Horsburgh, Cappel and Conley have brought the theories and
methodologies of various disciplines to bear on the question of
the relationship of common sense to contract law. I think they
would all agree that common sense, whether we are examining it
from the perspective of the social sciences or the humanities, is a
way of signaling the relationship between law and culture or law
and society.
The relationship seems problematic, of course, because
culture is collective while contract discourse is individualistic. 2
Common sense is, in at least one of its many meanings, a word
that signals our belief in community and in the possibility of a
shared knowledge or understanding of human nature and social
life.3 In contrast, contract law is replete with examples of
Professor of Law at Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center in
Huntington, New York and co-author of two recent books, CULTIVATING
INTELLIGENCE: POWER, LAw AND THE POLITIcs OF TEACHING, with Louise
Harmon (New York University Press), and CONTRACTING LAW with Amy
Kastely and Sharon Horn (Carolina Academic Press). I would like to thank
my research assistants Angie Baker and Maja Ilic-Buxo, the members of the
law review, in particular John Mooney and Anthea des Etages for their hard
work and patience.
2 See Jay M. Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 829 (1983). (describing individualistic and collectivist patterns of
analysis which organize the various principles, policies and arguments found
in contract law).
3 See definitions of common sense in Lenora Ledwon, supra at 1070. The
collective aspect of common sense can be seen in the definition of the term as
"such ordinary complement of intelligence, that, if a person be deficient
therein, he is accounted mad or foolish." This definition is normative because
those who lack common sense are placed in categories reserved for those who
are unable to conform to community standards. Their behavior is deviant and
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rhetoric expressing an ideological commitment to voluntariness
and consent and deprecating government interference in private
ordering. This emphasis in contract law on individual liberty is
part of our political creed and an essential link between a basic
tenet of democracy and a commitment to a neo classical
conception of a free market economy.
Simply acknowledging the collective nature of contract
law is not the solution to the conflict between the ideology of
consent and the reality of social control and legal coercion.4 In
complex societies and in heterogeneous societies, and the United
common sense is sometimes referred to as something that is unlearned, a form
of "practical intelligence" or my favorite "mother wit." "Common Sense",
Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary 1913, (visited on Mar. 8, 2000),
<http://www.biblioma/Reference/Webster/data/1390.htnl>. Randy Barnett
claims that default rules reflect "commonsense or consensual understandings."
Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual
Consent, 78 VA. L. REv. 821 (1992); ...And Contractual.Consent, 3 S. CAL.
INTERDISCIPLINARY L. J. 421 (1993) ("tacit assumptions", conventional
commonsense, can be supplemented by rationality analysis and moral
analysis).
4 See, e.g., the discussion of the dichotomy between individual/state derived
contract terms and the U.C.C.'s use of the trade usage in Amy H. Kastely,
Stock Equipment for the Bargain in Fact: Trade Usage, "Express Terms, " and
Consistency Under Section 1-205 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 64 N. C.
L. REv. 777 (1986).
I have to admit that I do not understand the opposition that Barnett seems
determined to perpetuate with his description of consent theory as an
"antidote" for "relational/communitarian/leftist" theories of contract law.
Barnett, .. .And Contractual Consent supra note 3 at 430. His consent theory
begins with an assumption that contracting parties share a common culture. He
distinguishes relational theory as an analysis grounded in something called
"public policy." Public policy is also grounded in a cultural, that is,
normative, analysis. Impersonal, anonymous transactions are governed by
rules that are slightly different from those that govern the exchange or
economic relationships of people or entities that have had a long term
relationship or are interdependant in a way that makes one party vulnerable to
the other. In both cases the state, legislatively or judicially, supplies terms.
Harold Havighurst argued that contract in its "wild anarchic state" advances
the interests of the strong but that " in a society whose political organization is
democratic", the law is concerned with "justice" and with limiting the
freedom of the strong to impose their will on those who are less powerful.
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States is both, one expects to find more than one culture and
belief system. The problem we see in all the Gateway cases5 , not
6just Hill v. Gateway, and in other disputes that require the
application of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
however, is often not conflict between cultures, but conflict
within a culture.
Even within a "dominant " culture, beliefs and ideals
exist that conflict and contradict one another. Cultural
anthropologists, like John Conley who has written of Llewellyn's
anthropological background and its expression in Article 2, are
now quick to point out that the homogeneity that once was
thought to exist in culture is an illusion.7 Some inconsistencies
are easily ignored because culture is contextual. But other
inconsistencies are the by-product of real conflict and the need or
desire of different groups or segments of society to justify or
rationalize their respective commitment to the preservation or the
subversion of the status quo. 8
5 Hill v. Gateway 2000 Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) cert. denied 522
U.S. 808, 118 S. Ct. 47 (1997); Brower v. Gateway 2000, 676 N.Y.S.2d 569
(App. Div. 1998); Filias v. Gateway 2000, 1998 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 20358
(D. N.D. M. 1998); Kiocek v. Gateway Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 ( D.
Kan. 2000); dismissed, 2000 WL 1372886 (D.Kan.); WVestendorf v. Gateway
2000 Inc., 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 54; 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.2d 1110 (Del.
Ch. 2000).
6 105 F.3d 1147 (1997).
7 It is an illusion for which anthropologists* are partly responsible. James
Clifford has written a wonderful essay in which he contrasts the
"multisensory, multifocal perceptions and encounters of participant
observation" and the often "heterophonic" and disagreeing voices that appear
in the anthropologists fieldnotes disappear in the "ideological, naturalizing
discourse" that is the convention in ethnographic writing. James Clifford,
Notes on (Field)notes in FIELDNOTES: THE MAKINGS OF ANTHROPOLOGY 47-
70 (Roger Sanjek ed.) (1990).
8 It is important but extremely difficult to distinguish those cases where an
individual believes it to be in his own self-interest to resist a legal rule or
social norm that works for the benefit of a trading partner and either (a) cases
where the resistance reflects social change - a shift in cultural attitudes or
beliefs and (b) the persistent challenge to entrenched norms by members of a
group consistently disadvantaged or harmed by a particular rule or practice.
Although Jay Feinman has argued that "there simply does not exist an
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In the Gateway cases the cultural or normative contests
are various. There are conflicts over (1) the norms to which
sellers should be held; 9(2) whether and under what conditions
those norms can be avoided'°; (3) the norms that govern the
activist judge 11 and (4) the basic requirements of a participatory
and representative democracy. 12
In this essay I hope to examine and comment on each of
these contests and on the jurisprudence of judges like Frank
Easterbrook who would refashion the law and the lives of
millions of consumers with his vision of human society and
prove that "parties do not share beliefs on what is appropriate commercial
behavior," I would argue that case law shows the existence of shared values
and the contests over those shared values. Courts do make normative choices
- either to confirm the existing norms or to legitimize the competing values
and norms, but it is no solution to say that the choice is made on a "policy
basis." See Feinman, supra note 2 at 837.
9 In each of the Gateway cases cited supra note 5, plaintiffs alleged breach of
warranty and failure to provide the technical support promised at the time the
computer was purchased. In Hill and Filias the plaintiffs also asserted claims
under the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §1961
et seq. (hereinafter RICO)
10 At issue in all these cases was the assent of the consumer to an arbitration
term included in the Standard Terms and Conditions Agreement (STCA), with
a term that stipulated that the consumer "accepted" these terms if he or she
kept the computer more than thirty (or in some cases, five) days. The STCA
was included in the box with the computers that were sold.
" There is some dispute over law and procedures that equalize power. All of
the cases were brought as class actions. Class actions are a procedural device
used to empower marginal or emerging groups. But the form of litigation is
often criticized because it limits the autonomy of the individual class member.
For an example of the opposition to class actions on the grounds that it gives
too much power to consumers see, e.g., John M. Landers, Of Legalized
Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the Substance-
Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 842 (1974). Statutes like RICO and
the Deceptive Trade Practices Acts of the various states are attractive because
they usually permit plaintiffs to recover treble damages. Similarly the
doctrines that disfavor contracts of adhesion and invalidate unconscionable
contracts or contract terms are sometimes referred to as "equalizers" where
the parties to a contract do not have equal bargaining power. See, e.g., the
discussion of unconscionability as a "counteractant to superior bargaining
power" in HAVIGHURST, supra note 4 at 111.
2 See HAVIGHURST supra note 4 discussing the use of power in contract to
deny a party his or her "right to a day in court."
1208 [Vol 16
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human relationships. In the process I hope to revisit some of the
themes that have been presented in the essays of the several
authors included in this symposium issue. Among these are the
function or role of the judiciary in the creation and imposition of
norms governing behavior in exchange relationships, the role
ambiguity might play in the creation of a successful statute, and
the importance of imagination in the work of judging.
A CODE, CONTINUITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE
As a person who dabbles in anthropology, I have always
had an abiding interest in the Uniform Commercial Code. Like
Professor Conley, I like to think of it as an attempt by Karl
Llewellyn to put his knowledge of anthropology to work. 13 What
I admire most about the statute and, from my way of thinking,
one of the reasons why the statute is very successful, is that it
13 Llewelyn credited his experience with the Cheyenne for what he felt were
new insights he gained into the judicial process. "You suddenly hit upon the
beauty and vision in a strange culture, and you may be the person in whom a
seed takes root, so that light is shed at home. The values of comparative law
and comparative politics are not different except that the chances for deep
illumination may be less." KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMION LAW
TRADMON: DECIDING APPEALs 513 n. 13 (1960). He went further in
explaining exactly what he learned that was useful in drafting a statute or
code:
...the law of the Cheyenne Indians made clear to me what I had never
before dreamed: to wit, that law and justice had no need at all to be in
conflict or even in too much tension, but could instead represent a
daily working harmony. ...I had mostly taken for granted a sort of
perpetual struggle between the needs of regularity and form and the
precedent-phase of justice on the one side and, on the other, any
dynamic readjustment of a going system to what just needed to be
done. ...I had to get to the Cheyennes in order to wake up to the fact
that the tension between form, or precedent, or other tradition and
perceived need requires, in nature, to be a tension only for the single
crisis ...an adequately resilient legal system can on occasion, or even
almost regularly, absorb the particular trouble and resolve it each time
into a new, usefully guiding, forward looking felt standard-for-action
or even rule-of-law.
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contains language that accommodates a wide range of beliefs that
animate legal decision makers - lawyers, litigators and judges -
as well as the businessmen and women whose agreements are
subject to the statute. 4
I don't know whether the flexibility of the U.C.C. was
part of the original concept. Some of the flexibility that the
commentary justifies may well have resulted from conscious
attempts to compromise between competing interests during or
after the drafting process. The avowed purpose of the drafters
was to provide a statute that would be flexible enough to handle a
world the drafters could not imagine at the time they went about
their work. 15
The flexibility in U.C.C. Article 2 actually serves a more
immediate purpose. It mediates the conflicting values that
coexist in contemporary contract law. Flexibility has a cost and
that cost may be the inconsistencies and contradictions that critics
14 Professors Robert E. Scott and Alan Schwartz have done an analysis of the
drafting process for uniform statutes. Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, The
Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 595 (1995).
Their analysis examines the political economy and the operation of the
American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. These authors explain why some statutes contain bright
line rules while others have rather vague standards. They conclude that when
there are different interest groups involved in the drafting process, the terms
of a statute are likely to be vague and amorphous. If the drafting process is
dominated by one group, it is more likely that a statute will have bright line
rules rather than vague standards.
1- See, e.g., Comment 1 to §1-102:
This Act is drawn to provide flexibility so that, since it is intended to
be a semi-permanent piece of legislation, it will provide its own
machinery for expansion of commercial practices. It is intended to
make it possible for the law embodied by this Act to be developed by
the courts in light of unforeseen and new circumstances. (Emphasis
added).
COMMERCIAL AND DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW: SELECTED STATUTES 4 (1993).
See also the discussion of Karl Llewellyn and his intentions with respect to the
Uniform Commerical Code in Grant Gilmore, On Statutory Obsolescence, 39
U. COLO. L. REV. 461 (1967).
1210 [Vol 16
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of Article 2 find troubling. I would argue that these
contradictions are appropriate and even necessary.
Acknowledgement of the power of the formal or
traditional contract rules and the ideals that animate them can be
found in Article 2 and so can language in various provisions that
is suffuse with a completely different world view. In this
competing vision of contract law, courts enforce bargains or the
expectation that there is a binding legal obligation in
circumstances where the traditional rules might not. But there are
plenty of ways to deny enforcement as well. This is, after all, a
statute that allows you to find a contract in the behavior of the
parties, especially conduct that "recognizes the existence of a
contract" despite (1) missing terms - if there is a reasonably
certain basis for measuring damages - and (2) the fact that the
"moment of the making" is indeterminate.1 6 Yet the very same
section offers an escape hatch into the interpretive realm of
"intent", providing courts or judges who are so inclined with
language they can use to deny enforcement. It is thus possible to
reach diametrically opposed results on the same or similar facts
while using the same statutory provision. 17 In any event, buyers
and sellers alike find that the statute is capable, in the right
hands, of vindicating an expectation that a bargain exists and
providing a remedy when that expectation is disappointed.
As Professor Ledwon suggests in her article, ambiguity
has its uses.' 8 Clarity might actually undermine a statute while
ambiguity could be the key to its success. A statute drafted to
embody a particular ideology, advancing or embracing one
among many competing values, runs the risk of rejection or
obsolescence. 19 When judges can't find language in a statute that
they can use to justify their decisions, they are tempted to ignore
16 U.C.C. § 2-204 (1977).
17 id.
'a Lenora Ledwon, supra note 3 at 1088.
19 "Judges have been taught to honor legislative supremacy and to leave
untouched all constitutionally valid statutes, but they also have been trained to
think of the law as functional, as responsive to current needs and current
majorities, and as abhorring discriminations, special treatments, and
inconsistencies not required by current majorities." GuDO CALABtisi, A
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or rewrite the statute. But if there is language that lends itself to
very different outcomes (accompanied by a commentary that
encourages a particular reading of the statute), very little
rewriting is necessary. And there is room for courts to change
their minds, to move in the direction that the drafters had in
mind.20
Uniformity is an ideal. If "uniformity" were a
destination, no one vehicle, especially a statute, would be suitable
for such a trip. The shared (mythical) culture that would support
a uniform statute, with perfect expression and internal
consistency, cannot exist in the absence of complete identity in
histories, life experiences, knowledge and, ultimately, beliefs and
values.
That being said, I would add that while culture is not
necessarily homogeneous, it is not chaos either. Neither is
flexibility the same thing as anarchy. Flexibility minimizes
conflict in a disciplined way. Anarchy is a no holds barred, bare-
fisted exercise of brute force. It is power unleashed or power
unrestrained. Hill v. Gateway is, in my opinion, an invitation to
return to what Harold Havighurst called contract as "wild
anarchic state."
2
It is no doubt true that a model of commercial law based
on a homogeneous Cheyenne society might seem inapposite to
mid twentieth century "white" commercial practices. What
Llewellyn seems to have derived from his experience with the
Cheyenne, however, is a sense of culture and law as a dynamic,
not a static, process.2 The inevitability of change, if not the
social disruption that accompanies it, animates the
anthropological method. The flexibility touted by the drafters
was explained in terms of social and technological change. At the
same time, if you are an anthropologist, and not an economist,
the decision to provide "off the rack" terms is not so much a
matter of efficiency as it is an expression of confidence or hope.
21 See, e.g. Ionics Inc. v. Elmwood Sensors Inc., 110 F.3d 184 (1st Cir. 1997)
(overruling Roto-Lith Ltd. v F. P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir.
1962)).
21 See HAVIGHURST, supra note 4.
22 See LLEWELLYN, supra note 13.
1212 [Vol 16
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There is hope that despite the messiness of any single culture and
the complexity of a heterogeneous society with its multiple
cultures, it may still be possible at any point in time to identify
shared values and beliefs (if not nationally, then locally or in a
particular trade.)
So there are several aspects of the U.C.C. that seem
"anthropological": the recognition that change is inevitable but
that the tenacity of culture ensures continuity; the explicit
incorporation of various kinds of communities: local, trade and
merchant; the use of standards that are supposed to reflect the
belief of the mores of a marketplace: good faith, diligence,
reasonableness and care.23 The standards that are included,
commercial reasonableness, fair dealing, merchantability, like all
cultural phenomena, derive content and specificity in a particular
context. Over time, what "passes without objection in the trade"
as a personal computer, or what might be considered "fair or
average quality" or the "ordinary purpose" for which such goods
are fit, might change. The U.C.C.'s use of standards can
accommodate those changes.
Those who agree with Judge Easterbrook in his analysis
of Article 2's application to consumer purchases of software and
hardware often point to the changes in technology in the
information or internet economy. Do the changes that have
occurred in the past decade or the past two decades warrant a
completely different approach to sales transactions? Have our
basic assumptions about human relationships altered? Are there
norms that exist that have not yet found expression in the law?
Are there norms that are emerging; norms that the judges
imagine would improve the human condition - whether we think
of that in terms of wealth or efficiency or some other non-
quantifiable but laudable quality?
23 The importance of continuity and change is seen in the use of language that
can be used over and over again to justify results even as the meaning of the
words and the standards alters because of technological and socio-economic
change. In contrast, a standard such as good faith that is meant to have the
widest application references a really fundamental shared value - honesty -
unless it is being used as a status ethic, as in the case of merchants where
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Judge Easterbrook thinks the expectations of the average
consumer have altered. At one point in ProCD, the precedent on
which he relies in Hill v. Gateway 2000, he suggests that a rule
that would require advance notice of the terms of the contract
would "return transactions to the horse-and-buggy age." 24 There
are probably many who agree with the sentiment, if not the
overstatement. Other courts and commentators have noted the
changes that mass production has wrought in our society and in
our expectations:
Underlying the Code provisions is the recognition of the
revolutionary change in business practices in this century. The
purchase of goods is no longer a simple transaction in which a
buyer purchases individually made goods from a seller in a face
to face transaction. Our economy depends on a complex
system for the manufacture, distribution, and sale of goods, a
system in which manufacturers and consumers rarely meet.
Faceless manufacturers mass-produce goods for unknown
consumers who purchase those goods from merchants
exercising little or no control over the quality of their
production. In an age of dssembly lines, we are accustomed to
cars with scratches, television sets without knobs and other
goods with all kinds of defects. Buyers no longer expect a
"perfect tender." If a merchant sells defective goods, the
reasonable expectation of the parties is that the buyer will
return those goods and that the seller will repair or replace
them.25
The U.C.C. was drafted and adopted in the post World
War II era as the United States became a "consumer economy"
characterized by mass consumption, modern consumption and
mass culture.26 It was not just the alienation of the assembly line
24 ProCD, Inc. v. Matthew Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996).
25 Ramirez v. Autosport, 88 N.J. 277, 440 A.2d 1345 (N.J. S. Ct. 1982).
26 Paul Glennie, Consumption Within Historical Studies in ACKNOWLEDGING
CONSUMPTION 165 (Daniel Miller, ed., 1995). According to Glennie, scholars
in that discipline have located the beginning of the consumer society in every
century since the 16d. Glennie reports that most historians
1214 [Vol 16
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worker with which the drafters had to contend or the
development of the ubiquitous and functional plastic part. It was
the ever-present problem of human frailty - our lack of precision
or sloppiness, unwarranted optimism, gullibility, blind faith.
And let us not forget greed. What should be done about human
frailty in an era of mass consumption?
Computer companies like Gateway have not altered the
marketing strategies documented by social scientists documented
at that time, particularly the temptation to manufacture need
through strategies like planned obsolescence.27 In this consumer
28age, this consumer culture, technological advances are
accompanied by bugs and glitches and all manner of problems
that may or may not be resolved by the manufacturer. In an
social life and consumer acquisitiveness tied to fashion and, increasingly,
advertising." Id.
27 VANCE PACKARD, THE WASTE MAKERS (1960). There is a quote from
Dorothy Sayers that probably says as much about the changes in our society as
anything else. "A society in which consumption has to be artificially
stimulated in order to keep production going is a society founded on trash and
waste, and such a society is a house built upon sand." DOROTHY L. SAYERS,
CREED OR CHAOS, quoted in WASTE MAKERS supra. Gateway, adopting a
strategy used by automobile companies, has seized on the problem of
obsolescence and turned it into a marketing advantage. See generally a
description of the Gateway Easy Pay Plan (now called Your :) Ware) that
includes the option to "upgrade" as new technology makes the computer you
purchased obsolete. Asa Somers, Direct Channel Trendsetter in COMPUTER
SHOPPER, Jan. 1999. Already some complaints have been heard in the land
about the advertisements for this installment payment plan, because it is
advertised at a low interest rate of 14. 9%, but can cost as much as 27% and
the "trade in" on your old PC is based on wholesale, not retail, value. See
Dawn C. Chmielewski, Despite the Coine-Ons, Leasing a New Computer is
Pricey; Way to Go, Click on Computers, THE BUFFALO NE-wS, Aug. 4, 1998,
at 7D.
28 Consumption is now the subject of study by those who practice in
disciplines other than economics, including philosophers, anthropologists and
sociologists. See generally Johnathan Schroeder, Ethics of Consumption: The
Good Life, Justice and Global Stewardship, J. OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, Dec.
1999 (book review). See also Daniel Miller, Consumption Studies as the
Transformation of Anthropology in ACKNOWLEDGING CONSUMPTION (Daniel
Miller, ed.,1995); CULTURE AND CONSUMPTION: NEW APPROACHES TO THE
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expanding economy driven by the creativity of a new breed of
entrepreneurs, companies may experience demand that exceeds
their ability to deliver.29 Should they be protected from the costs
that arise from their inexperience or inability to expand quickly
enough to meet that demand? Is this a cost that should be borne
by the consumer for the benefit of the entire society? Why
should the risk of poor management decisions fall on the
consumer rather than the manager of a company, like Gateway,
whose growth was astronomical.3 °
THE MORES IN A CHANGING MARKETPLACE
At the heart of the Gateway cases is consumer
dissatisfaction with a product and the remedy that the seller
offered them.3' If Gateway had been able to fix the problems
with the computers, it is unlikely that suits would have been filed
by consumers in Illinois, Indiana, Delaware, Kansas, and New
York. Nor would the Cleveland office of the Federal Trade
Commission have filed a complaint alleging violations of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, the rules promulgated under that
29 See generally Robert L. Simons, How Risky Is Your Business, HARV. BUS.
REv. 85 (MAY/JUNE 1999)(describing the risks of rapid growth that comes
when managers do not assess the ability of the company's infrastructure to
support such growth -reducing quality - or personnel that can result in
increased customer complaints. In 1997 Gateway 2000 increased its support
operations by adding two new technical support centers in Colorado and New
Mexico which were to add 250 people by year end and 700 more in the future
while opening 14 or more showrooms. Joanne Gordon, Green Pastures for
Gateway, CHAIN STORE AGE EXECUTIVE WITH SHOPPING CENTER AGE, Nov.
1997. Perhaps if Ted Waitt had the benefit of the risk exposure calculator
devised by Professor Simons, there would not have been the public outcry that
led to the flurry of lawsuits, an FTC consent decree and a fine of $270,000.
30 According to one report, revenues grew 700% from 1987-1988 and 488%
the following year. In 1996 and 1997, Gateway was expanding its business in
hopes of maintaining its growth. Gordon, supra note 29.
31 Gateway Cases, supra note 5.
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act and the Federal Trade Commission Act and the related
regulations.3 2 Two years earlier, FamilyPC Magazine ranked the
Gateway P5-120 number 3 best buy out of the eight computers it
tested. 33 But stories of Gateway products that did not work or
services not delivered as promised also spread.34 It might have
been a problem with rapid growth." It might have been a case of
technological innovation gone wrong. Or maybe it was just
shoddy workmanship or puffery. Whatever the issues, the
"repair or replace" remedy offered by the company was not
acceptable to the consumers who did not get what they were
promised.
Gateway is also about the process of contract formation
and what the reasonable expectations of consumers are or should
be. Arthur Corbin described contract law as the field of law that
"attempts the realization of reasonable expectations that have
been induced by the making of a promise."m For Corbin,
"reasonableness" was grounded in collective sentiment - "what
most people would expect" and a promise that "most people
would perform." 37 And this notion of reasonableness had
embedded within it the "mores of men." 38
32 In the Matter of Gateway 2000, Inc., No. C-3844, 1998 WL 918348 (Dec.
22, 1998) (FrC); In the Matter of Gateway 2000, Inc., Agreement Containing
Consent Order to Cease and Desist, 1998 WL 407401(FTC).33Lisa Holton, Financial Two Cents Worth, Cm. SUN TmEs, 93, (Oct. 13,
1996).
34 See, e.g., Peter Jasco, TWzat Price CD-ROM hardware? INFORMATION
TODAY, Sept. 1996 (describing the "cheap components" in Gateway's
Anniversary PC. Gateway also got into trouble with the FTC over its false
advertising statements about its refund policy and on site warranty service and
as a result it entered into a consent decree with the FTC that cost it S290,000.
See also JoAnn Wilcox, Teclnology for the Office, SUCCESSFUL FARMING,
Dec. 1, 1999 (five hours to get help from Gateway help line.)
35 See discussion of Gateway growth supra note 30.
36 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1 (1952).
37 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1 (1952). Despite his
statements that suggest "reasonableness" is about shared values, Corbin also
recognizes that "customs and mores are themselves complex, variable with
time and place, inconsistent an contradictory." Nonetheless, he thought the
notion of "reasonableness" gave judges something to hang on to. Id.
38 The language of neo-classical economics may have more power, but
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Today the very suggestion that there are "mores", that
there is any sort of consensus as to what people expect or what
most people will do with respect to exchange relationships, is
being challenged. Perhaps there is a sense in various
communities: customers of Gateway, lawmakers like Judge
Easterbrook and the Greek Chorus of law professors, legislators,
lawyers for companies like Gateway, functionaries at government
agencies, and consumer advocates - that this is a time of
unprecedented change. It is not just the sustained economic
growth over the past decade casts doubt on some of the basic
assumptions in the field of macro-economics (the relationship
between employment and inflation is one that comes to mind)."
especially sociology, provide an alternative way to think and talk about the
law. One of the topics of interest even among those who specialize in law and
economics is the relationship between law and social norms. See, e.g.,
Shubha Ghosh, Where's the Sense in Hill v. Gateway 2000? : Reflections on
the Visible Hand of Norm Creation, supra at 1127. See also, Richard H.
Pildes, Symposium: Law, Economics and Norms: The Destruction of Social
Capital Through Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2055 (1996); and Cass R.
Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. OF PA. L. REv. 2021
(1996). I am somewhat confused about discussions about the effect of law on
social norms or the relationship between law and social norms because I was
taught that the word or concept "norm" includes informal and formal rules.
Of course, my definition of norm is derivative, learned from Kingsley Davis,
the author of HUMAN SOCIETY, more than thirty years ago. I suspect the
meaning has not changed all that much. The typology of norms Davis
describes classifies norms in terms of the importance attached to a norm and
the type of sanction imposed for its violation. KINGSLEY DAVIS, HUMAN
SOCIETY 52-82 (1966). Between folkways, which are very informal, and law,
which is very formal, are mores. "Each more is believed to be essential to
social welfare" Kingsley Davis instructed me and mores, I was told, "relate
to the fundamental needs of society." Most importantly, " Mores are taken
for granted as being a highly important part of the nature of things. Belief
rationalizes them in the form of myth, ritual expresses them in the form of
symbols and action embodies them in form of right conduct. " Id. at 60.
Kingsley Davis -argued that law did not determine "fundamental sentiments",
but he did think that it could be used to alter social relationships and thus was
an "advanced instrument of social change." Id at 70.
39 For a discussion of the recent history and the changes that have taken place,
see generally Laura D'Andrea Tyson, Old Economic Logic in the New
Economy, 41 CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW 8, June 22, 1999 and Justin
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There is a more general sense of uncertainty. We know where
we have been but we are not yet sure where we are going.
Either we are in unfamiliar and uncharted territory or the
landmarks that we used to navigate in the past have disappeared -
- demolished in the name of progress to make room for the
construction of the ideological equivalent of a mega mall or
warehouse store.
Some economists suggest that there is a parallel between
the introduction of electricity and the growth of mass production
and the introduction of the computer and the commencement of
what they call the "information age." 40 The growth of
consumerism as a way of life in the United States and across the
world has had political consequences. Consumerism laid the Evil
Empire low. It was not missles but blue jeans that fomented
unrest behind the Iron Curtain. It was consumerism that fed the
blazing economies in the Pacific Basin until they collapsed in the
conflagration of speculation, over-expansion and graft.4' In this
new age, hegemony: consumer culture has no competition.
In the United States, the "consumer movement" could
have been characterized either as a reflection of the traditional
liberal values that affirm and support the rights of individuals or
as a form of incipient class identity. 2 Where there was potential
or actual conflict between consumer and manufacturer or retailer
or creditor, the democratic process yielded significant legislation
for the protection of the consumer. Political scientists might
explain it in terms of interest group pojitics, but that does little to
disprove the existence of mores that govern market behavior.
The U.C.C. has something to say about quality. §2-313
says it is reasonable, a matter of common sense, perhaps, to
think that ". . . the probability is small that a real price was
4 0 Tyson, supra note 39.
41 Ricardo Saludo, Meltdown Revisited, AsiA WEEK 34, JULY 21, 2000 (review
of five books examining both the 'East Asian miracle' and the crisis that ended
it).
41 Consumerism has been defined as a "social movement" that redistributes
power and adjusts relations between buyers and sellers. William K. Darley
and Denise M. Johnson, Cross-National Comparison of Consumer Attitudes
Towards Conswnerisin In Four Developing Countries, 27 J. of CONSUMER
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intended to be exchanged for a pseudo-obligation.... "43 This
comment about quality is consistent with the public concern with
obsolescence of quality, a much-criticized strategy of sellers for
increasing consumption. Cheaper materials, materials designed
to break down or wear out, are used in place of those that would
ensure longer durability. Often the "debasement" of quality is
hidden from the consumer and only becomes apparent with use
and the passage of time.44
Most people are frustrated by, but live with, the
consequences of consumerism including the lack of durability of
products. But there is such a thing as consumer resistance.
45
Sometimes statutory protections are invoked. Sometimes self-
help is employed. One of my all time favorite stories illustrates
the way a failure to comply with market norms on one side of a
transaction may provoke an abandonment of ethical norms on the
other side as well. A friend of mine has a father in law who is a
senior citizen. She tells me that when he gets angry because
some appliance breaks before he thinks it should, he goes to the
store and buys a replacement -- a phone or clock radio or toaster
oven. He then goes home and puts the broken item in the box
and returns it to the store for a refund. His act is fraudulent but
it is also subversive, a form of resistance to the notion that we
live in a "disposable" society.
That part of the current consumerist struggle is being
played out with respect to the quality of computers (and the
monopoly power of software manufacturers) is predictable and
43 U.C.C. § 2-313 Comment 4. Although this statement appears in the
comment to the section on express warranties, the general import of the
statement provides a justification for implied warranties as well as a reason
why express warranties should not be disclaimable.
44 PACKARD supra note 27 at 57.
45 Apparently there is a body of work on "consumer resistance strategies"
including "consumer boycotts, cooperative movements, voluntary simplicity,
market and advertising critiques, and the transformation of mass produced
objects into individuated possessions and experiences." Russell W. Belk,
Studies in The New Consumer Behavior in ACKNOWLEDGING CONSUMPTION
67 (Daniel Miller, ed., 1995).
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appropriately symbolic. 46 The computer, especially the personal
computer, is for many the symbol of the transformation of the
economy into an "information" or an "internet" society. It is a
consumer good that is linked to individual liberty and to upward
mobility.
The problem with the personal computer is cost - it is
both expensive and affordable. A computer is priced high
enough to make repeat purchases problematic, but not low
enough to make it disposable. It is one thing to have to throw
away a pocket calculator and buy a replacement only weeks after
it was purchased. It is quite another matter to have to live
unhappily with a computer that doesn't work as promised or to
throw away a personal computer purchased only a few weeks or
months earlier. 47 It is not as expensive as a car, but not as
inexpensive as the plastic, throw-away electronic appliances that
clutter up our offices and kitchens.
Nor is a computer indispensable, at least for the vast
majority of citizens. A computer at home and the advantages this
provides is still a luxury. But a computer may become a
necessity in much the same way an automobile became a
necessity in our culture. If we succeed in making computer
literacy a part of the basic education children are expected to
receive and computer access critical to participation in everything
from casting a vote to doing our jobs, we might see a shift in the
way we classify this particular piece of technology.
The controversy is about computers, but it is also about
mores that govern market participation. An awareness of human
frailty, of human weakness, plays a significant role in cases
involving breach of warranty and possible misrepresentation.
46 It is hard to lug a PC around but with the proliferation of laptop computers
and the creation of the "palm pilot," the relationship between computers as a
consumer good and the symbolic function of consumption is enhanced. But
see the argument that consumption serves either as a message or that
"lifestyle" as created by an individual's consuming choices is determinative of
or communicates that person's identity in Colin Campbell, The Sociology of
Consumption in ACKNOWLEDGING CONSUMPTION 111-117 (Daniel Miller, ed.
1995).
47 Jake Kirchner, Today's PC: Inexpensive and Obsolete: Problem of Built in




Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2000
TOURO LAW REVIEW
Contrary to the theories advanced about contracts, blame and
fault play important roles in sorting out contract disputes. The
question is who has been guilty of behavior that the law wishes to
encourage or deter. If minimum standards of quality are
expected of the manufacturer, then the responsibility is his if the
goods do not meet those standards. But in the past and in the
present, and the Gateway case is only one example, courts that
wish to protect the producer focus attention instead on the
deficiencies of buyers using doctrines like caveat emptor and duty
to read.48 Beyond the issue of fault is the subtle suggestion of
patent dishonesty and untrustworthiness that would open the
floodgates of litigation.49
Contests over such norms are seldom concluded in a
month, a year, a decade or a century. There is still substantial
disagreement about the content as well as the utility of the
standards to which manufacturers, sellers, or financing
companies, for instance, should be held. There is a
corresponding argument about the appropriateness of legislation
or court decisions that purport to adopt or enforce any "social"
norms.
Neo-classical economists argue that the market itself is
disciplinary. 50 Some postmodern theorists speculate that "power
today is located above all in consumers, such as the
housewife.", 51 The problem with this argument is that the
48 Gateway, 105 F.3d at 1149. See also Michael I. Meyerson, The
Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective Theory of Consumer Form
Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1263 (1993) ("Courts moralistically
preached that if a peson failed to read he contract, 'he cannot set up his own
carelessness and indolence as a defense.'" quoting from McNinch v.
Northwest Thresher Col, 100 P.524, 526 (Okla. 1909))
49 " An oral recitation would mot avoid customers' assertions (whether true or
feigned) that the clerk did not read term X to them, or that they did not
remember or understand it." Gateway, 105 F.3d at 1149.
50 This credo: you don't need the law if you've got the market is exemplified
by Easterbrook's comment in ProCD: " Competition Among Vendors, not
judicial revision of a package's contents, is how consumers are protected in a
market economy." 86 F.3d at 1453.
51 Miller blends Foucault with de Toqueville to discuss power as both "diffuse
but also ambivalent." Daniel Miller, Constumption as the Vanguard of History:
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"market" offers no remedy for those who suffer injury, no
formal or public pronouncement of the norms that are being
vindicated (which may cause both buyers and sellers to be
confused). The price of Gateway stock has declined and so have
earnings.52  Was it reputation, recession or the greater
sophistication on the part of those who purchase computers?
Does economic waste occur in the time it takes for information
about the aberrant or deviant behavior to reach a wide enough
segment of the market to cause a reaction that would act as a
form of discipline on sellers? And even those who theorize about
the location of power in the mass of consumers ( a theory about
which I am somewhat skeptical), acknowledge that this power is
both enabling and repressive.
53
JURIDICAL NORMS
A judge like Frank Easterbrook who decides to lead
rather than follow should expect resistance. There will be those
who resent his ambition. There will be others who object to the
direction in which he is headed or the route he has chosen to
reach a particular objective. Much of the negative reaction to the
decision in Hill v. Gateway 2000 is a reaction to the strategies
employed by Judge Frank Easterbrook. 4 Judge Easterbrook did
violence to Article 2.
A Polemic 1y Way of an Introduction in ACKNOWLEDGING CONSUMPTION 10-
11 (Dennis Miller, ed.,1995).
52 Gateway's earnings declined over several quarters. But other PC companies
were also experiencing declining revenues. See, e.g., Edward Iwata, Dell
Stock Pluinmets After Hours, U.S.A. TODAY, Jan. 27, 2000. (reporting a
decline in the revenues for Dell, Gateway and Compaq computers). Finally in
early 2001, the resignation of the CEO of Gateway was announced. See
Barnaby J. Feder, Chief Executive Resigns at Gateway anti Founder Retuns to
Resume Control, NY TIMEs, Jan. 30, 2001, at C, p. 6, Col. 1 Technology.
53 Miller, supra note 51 at 10.
"4 See, e.g. the list of articles criticizing the Easterbrook's reasoning which
can be found in Klocek v. Gateway Inc., 104 F. Supp.2d 1332, 1339 n.9 (D.
Kan. June. 15, 2000), dismissed 2000 WL 1372886 (D. Kan. Sept. 6, 2000).
55 Why did Easterbrook argue that the statute did not apply? The simple
answer would be that if an arbitration provision is an additional term, it would
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While judges are free to do exactly what Easterbrook has
done, there are norms that govern judicial behavior, norms that
apply when a judge is an "activist", the role that Easterbrook has
assumed.56 Surely there should be some acknowledgement that
arbitration term is material. In Schulze v. Burch Biscuit Company, 831 F.2d
709 (7th Cir. 1987) the court concluded that the test for materiality in Illinois
was surprise and hardship. It then reasoned that the repeated use of
acknowledgements in the formation of multiple contracts would eliminate the
element of surprise. Unless the Hills had engaged in repeated transactions
with Gateway, the exception that eliminated surprise in Schulze would not
apply. See, also ATD American Co. v. Imptex International Inc., 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6426 (D. Pa., May 16, 1994) and citations to Pennsylvania cases
holding that an arbitration term is material for purposes of 2-207; Universal
Plumbing and Piping Supply, Inc., v. Grimberg, Inc. 596 F. Supp. 1383,
1385 (Oct. 29, 1984)(citing cases in Nebraska, 3d Cir., 4th Cir., and the
Eastern District of New York that hold an arbitration provision is material).
56 At the swearing in for Judge Ann Williams, see Mark Schauerte, Chicago
Lawyer of the Year: Judge Ann Claire Williams, CHICAGO LAWYER, Dec.
2000, I listened to a partner from Winston and Strawn, the attorneys for
Gateway, who offered praise of the new Judge but also felt it appropriate to
comment on the "courage" of Judge Easterbrook. That courage was required,
I have no doubt. As Karl Llewellyn points out :
to be right discretion, to be lawful exercise of discretion ... the action so
far as it affects any man or group adversely must be undertaken with a
feeling, explicit or implicit, of willingness, of readiness to do the like
again ... [and] a willingness to have the action known and looked at...
KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 217
(1960).
The traditions, ideals and values that constrain judges have been described in
various ways, most of them concern the limits on judicial discretion in the
common law. See, e.g. BENJAMEN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS (1991); MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE
COMMON LAW (1988). The rules that govern statutory interpretation may
vary, but the U.C.C. article 2 is not an ordinary statute. It is a code. See
discussion of the intention of the drafters supra note 16 and accompanying
text.
I am discussing only the informal sanctions that limit or constrain the
freedom judges have in reaching a particular decision. This is not the place
for a discussion of the formal sanctions which are now available. See, e.g. 28
U.S.C. 372 (c) (1) (any person alleging that a circuit, district, or bankruptcy
judge has engaged in conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious
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statements have been made that run counter to traditional
understanding or commonplace assumptions about the way the
world of contract law is organized. Easterbrook creates a false
dichotomy in the first paragraph of the opinion contrasting a
contract with "no terms" - ignoring the terms the statute
supplies, including warranties of merchantability - with a
contract with the terms drafted by the seller.
Easterbrook follows up with a rhetorical question:
"Where's the sense in that?" But even when this question is read
narrowly, it is easy to criticize Easterbrook's claim that the result
in Gateway is compelled by the principle of stare decisis. Stare
decisis seems less principled than self-serving when, as in this
case, the prior precedent was written by the same judge the year
before. Zeidenberg v. ProCD IIc., s the case on which he relies,
and Hill v. Gateway 2000 59 are distinguishable both in terms of
the status of the parties to the dispute and the application of the
rules of offer and acceptance.
60
administration of the business of the courts... may file with the clerk of the
court of appeals of the circuit a written complaint). The best known cases
involving attacks on judges are those of Judges Sarokin and Lord. See, e.g.
Panel Discussion Disqualification of Judges (T7ze Sarokin Matter): Is it a
Threat to Judicial Independence, 58 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1063 (1992-93)
discussing Haines v. Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 97-98 (3d Cir. 1992).
See also Gardiner v. A. H. Robins Company, Inc., 747 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir.
1984) (striking 'so ordered' and reprimand of corporate officers from the
record of the case because the trial judge was 'biased' against the defendant
pharmaceutical company.) and SHELDON ENGLEMAYER AND ROBERT
WAGMAN, LORD'S JUSTICE (1985). The two judges were both accused of bias
by lawyers for major multinational corporations accused of mass torts.
57 Gateway, 105 F.3d at 1148.
5886 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. June 20, 1996).
59 Hill v. Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
60 Although Easterbrook dismisses the Hills' argument that Zeidenberg was a
merchant, in ProCD Easterbrook discusses the problem of price discrimination
and distinguishes commercial users from consumers. Whether he was a
merchant or not, Zeidenberg was not your ordinary consumer. 86 F.3d at
1450. Similarly, in ProCD, the license did not appear on the shrinkwrap and
it was not on the box, but the box did state that the softvare came with
"restrictions". In Gateway, although consumers might expect there to be
disclaimers of warranty, they certainly would not expect an arbitration




Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2000
TOURO LAW REVIEW
In ProCD, Easterbrook announced that the defendant had
conceded that the boxes of software on the shelves at a store were
an offer to the consumer. 61  If the buyer's lawyer made that
concession, it was imprudent. For as most first year law students
can tell you, a display of merchandise in a store window, and one
supposes on a shelf, is nothing more than an "invitation to
offer." 62 By the time we get to Gateway Easterbrook thinks it
sufficient to reiterate the fact that the vendor is the offeror and to
remind us of another axiom of contract law - the offeror is
master of the offer.
Judge Easterbrook ignored both §§ 2-207 and 2-206, the
commentary to these sections, the existing precedent interpreting
the statute and the commentary of scholars and experts on Article
2.63 He did not mention §2-204, although the language of that
section, taken in conjunction with the definitions of contract and
agreement, might have lent some support for his position. 64
The jurisprudence of Frank Easterbrook shocks me
because I am, admittedly, a legal realist or at least an admirer of
the legal realists.65 Professor Joo compares Frank Easterbrook to
Benjamen Cardozo, whom many would classify as a legal realist.
was found to be "material" under §2-207. Comment 4 refers to material
terms as those which "result in surprise and hardship." SELECTED
COMMERCIAL STATUTES 58 (2000 EDITION).
61 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450.
62 Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store, 251 Minn. 188, 86 N.W.2d
689 (Minn. 1957); Fisher v. Bell, 3 All E.R. 731 (Queen's Bench Division
1960).
63 See the discussion critical of Judge Easterbrook's interpretation of U.C.C.
§2-207 in the Gateway Thread supra pages 1149 to 1205. See, also Klocek,
104 F. Supp.2d 1332.
64 He did refer to §2-204 in ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452. Even if we were to use
the "gestalt" approach to contract formation in §2-204 which would look at all
the communications between the parties without an attempt to isolate a
particular document or communication that was the offer or the acceptance,
there is still the problem of finding assent in the passivity of the buyers unless
we are willing to assume 'tacit assent' from their silence or inaction. That too
flies in the face of traditional contract doctrine. See, e.g. RESTATEMENT
SECOND OF CONTRACTS § 69. (1981).
65 "To a great extent, we really are all legal realists now." Joseph William
Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465 (reviewing LAURA
KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986))
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The distance between Easterbrook and Cardozo, intellectually
and ideologically, can be measured in terms of the distance
between classical or neo-classical economics and the disciplines
of anthropology or sociology - the radically different
conceptions of human nature embodied in these disciplines as
well as the divergent methodologies employed by economists and
anthropologists. The jurisprudence of Cardozo was informed by
an appreciation for the humanities and for the social sciences -
for attempts to explain human behavior as it exists on the ground,
not a model of it that exists in the air. Cardozo acknowledged
mores as part of the mix in the process that is judicial decision-
making but he also recognized that mores and morality are not
always one and the same. 66
One of my more insightful students, Raizel Liebler came
up to me after class one day to comment on the connection she
saw between Cardozo's opinion and Jewish culture/religion. It
was very Jewish, she thought, to speak in terms of the ideal - to
presume that George Edward Kent would want to be reasonable
and then to determine his contractual intent according to that
standard of reasonableness.67 The "reasonableness" that Cardozo
describes is a moral vision - informed by a concern with the
potential for injustice. Cardozo's cases, many of which are
standard in contemporary casebooks, are replete with buyers and
sellers who defy the assumptions of neoclassical economics.
They are too human to fit within the two-dimensional self
interested, wealth maximizing characters that inhabit the law and
economics narratives.
68
In Jacob and Youngs, Inc. v. Kent,O buyers are
confronted with a minor variation or deviation in the performance
66 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JuDIcIAL PRocEss
(1921)(discussing Savigny and the idea that judges should "heed the mores of
his day").
67 See the discussion of Halacha in Deborah Waire Post, Profit, Progress and
Moral Imperatives, 9 TOURO L. REv.487 (reviewing MyR TAMARJ, IN THE
MARKETPLAcE: JEWISH BusINEss ETHICs (1991)).
6 Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank of Jamestown, 246
N.Y. 369, 159 N.E. 173 (1927), Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222
N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917).
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of the seller. Cardozo's assertion about reasonableness in Jacob
and Youngs, Inc. v. Kent is prefaced by an explanation of one of
his a priori assumptions: although human beings aspire to
perfection, we often fall short. What our fellow human beings
can expect from us, therefore, is performance that is as close to
perfection as we can reasonably come and compensation for
deviation when it occurs.
When a judge makes a comment like Cardozo's - that
human beings are all imperfect - it has a powerful impact. There
was no need for a long list of citations of prior authority. This
statement has the ring of truth, verifiable by each and every
reader who has ever reflected on his or her failures. It is a
statement about human nature (within Western culture) that
justifies the inferences that Cardozo draws and the decision he
reaches.
Easterbrook's cry "where's the sense in that" is also
intended as a justification for his decision, but it is more pointed.
It is both an assertion that his decision is dictated by the neutral
principle of stare decisis. The comment is directed at those who
might accuse him of acting arbitrarily, or worse yet, in a biased
way. He must have expected a reaction and he certainly got one.
Contracts experts fume over Easterbrook's interpretation of the
Uniform Commercial Code and take issue with the technical or
mechanical aspects of the decision. But his exclamation,
"where's the sense in that," also sets the stage for Easterbrook's
misreading of social realities and human nature.
Easterbrook tries to persuade his audience that it is
reasonable for a consumer to agree to terms sight unseen. It is
this process of reasoning, so formal and so remote from the
actual experiences of ordinary consumers that Professors
Horsburgh and Andrew Cappel reference in their comparison of
the cognitive processes employed by buyers and sellers.70
70 See Beverly Horsburgh and Andrew Cappel, Cognitition and Common Sense
in Contract Law, supra at 1091. See also Russell Korobkin, The Legal
hnplications of Psychology: Human Behavior, Behavioral Economics, and the
Law: Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological
Power of Default Rule and Form Terms, 51 VANDERBILT L. REv. 1583 (1998)
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Consumers, they conclude, the persons whose expectations are
referenced, do not reason the way Easterbrook does.
Easterbrook makes statements about shared meanings -
what we can be presumed to know and understand about our
commercial relationships. We have seen that his interpretation,
the meaning he assigns, is contested. Easterbrook is not
describing what "is", he is describing what "ought to be". This
is a case in which consumers are warned that they must read the
documents that come with merchandise they buy because those
terms will govern their commercial relationships. They are
instructed in the conduct that is expected of reasonable
consumers. They are to consult public sources, computer
magazines, the web sites of vendors or demand compliance with
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. 71
As Professor Joo points out, Cardozo crafted an approach
to breach of contract that also is normative. I do not mean to
suggest that the normative standard Cardozo spells out in Jacob
and Youngs Inc. v. Kent is uncontested. The demand for
perfection is not easily relinquished. The students I teach
certainly prefer the perfect tender rule. They argue vociferously
that the law should create and enforce a party's right to demand
perfection. The right to demand gives them some measure of
power in relationships where they are often the less powerful
party. The perceived need for a perfect tender rule derives from
shared experiences -- the frustration they associate with
disappointment, with the purchase of goods and services that did
not meet their expectations or live up to the promises that were
made to them.
But Cardozo's normative approach differs from that of
Judge Easterbrook. The opportunity to discuss how much is
enough, or the quality of performance that a buyer is entitled to
expect, is not ended. Judge Cardozo prescribes a process by
which that particular issue can be revisited over and over again.
Judgments about how much deviation will be tolerated may
change over time and if they do, these changes will be reflected
in emerging case law.
71 105 F.3d at 1150. See discussion of FTC consent decree with Gateway,
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In contrast, Judge Easterbrook employed an "end game"
strategy.72 The subject of the dispute, however that is defined --
whether it is the quality that a consumer can reasonably expect
from a computer manufacturer or the willingness of consumers to
submit disputes to arbitration -- has been settled with finality. A
rule has been stated and the facts constructed - the vendor is the
offeror, the offeror is master of the offer and §2-207 does not
apply when there is only one form. There can only be one
outcome. The vendor wins. End of conversation.
It is not the dishonesty in Judge Easterbrook's decision
that offends me; it is the ruthlessness of the strategy. It is no
excuse or justification to say that Cardozo sometimes misstated
the facts or that he fictionalized his decisions or that he omitted
relevant facts. 7  The differences between Cardozo and
Easterbrook are not a matter of poetry or rhetorical style. They
are more fundamental than that. Easterbrook and Cardozo define
justice in different ways. Judge Easterbrook thinks that reduced
cost is what all consumers want. In his decisions in ProCD and
Gateway, he explains why expectations must change if consumers
are to have the benefit of reduced costs. 74 Cardozo, I am sure,
would have been concerned with the moral aspects of this case,
with the overreaching that is obvious in the terms of the
arbitration provisions that Gateway (or its attorneys) crafted.
Easterbrook's analysis lacks an appreciation for history
and for the values and desires (not translatable into dollars and
72 "End game" is one of those terms that has taken on a life of its own. It has
been used to mean "exit strategy" or plans made in anticipation of a cessation
of demand or business. See explanation of end game as declining product
demand in Kathryn Rudie Harrigan and Michael E. Porter, End-Game
Strategies for Declining Industries, HARV. Bus. REv. 111, July/Aug. 1983.
I am using it in the traditional sense of a chess move that ends the game; a
strategy that ends the engagement when there is a contest or competition of
some sort. See WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 410 (1991).
73 RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOzo: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 42-43 (1990).
74 In Gateway, Easterbrook wrote" customers as a group are better off when
vendors skip costly and ineffectual steps such as telephonic recitation, and use
instead a simple approve-or-return device." 105 F.3d at 1149; In ProCD, he
instructed us in the process of price discrimination and told us that consumers
would lose the surplus value they presently experience because commercial
customers are charged a higher price. 86 F.3d at 1449.
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cents) that animate human beings. It lacks the imagination
(sometimes called empathy) that would allow him to see the full
consequences of the decision he reached in the Gateway case.76
75 There is a growing body of literature in the field of socio-economics that
offers a new model for human behavior other than the rational economic actor.
See, e.g. Romesh Diwan, Relational Wealth and the Quality of Life, 29 J. OF
SOCIO-ECONOMICs 305 (July 1, 2000).
76 Anthropologists continue to struggle - with much cynicism and no small
amount of postmodern angst - to achieve an emphatic understanding of the
people with whom they live, in and outside their own nations, while collecting
ethnographic data. See, e.g,. RENATO ROSALDO, CULTURE AND TRUTH: THE
REMAKING OF SoCIAL ANALYSIS (1993) (critiquing the classical norms of
anthropology including the idea that "the optimal field worker should dance on
the edge of paradox simultaneously becoming 'one of the people' and
remaining an academic.") See also James Clifford, Notes on (Field)notes in
FIELDNOTES: THE MAKING OF ANTHROPOLOGY (Roger Sanjek, ed.
1990)(discussing the "textual/rhetorical prefiguration of the facts" that are
observed/recorded by ethnographers).
Clifford Geertz's analysis of the work of Malinowski describes this ideal
with respect to process - the way research is conducted - as one that "at its
limits, anyway, virtually erases, or claims to, the affective distance between
the observer and the observed...." CLIFFORD GEERTZ, WORKS AND LIVES,
THE ANTHROPOLOGIST AS AUTHOR (1988).
Havighurst describes what he sees as the relationship between power, class
loyalty, and something he calls "sympathy" which, if it has as its predicate not
pity, but understanding, may require imagination as well.
...bias toward the weak, though not controlling, becomes a factor, I
believe, whenever the cultural environment is such that makers and
administrators of law are capable of sympathetic response towards all
classes subject to their authority, and when they are not so dominated
by loyalty toward the class that is strong as to be incapable of ever
seeing injustice in the justice the strong seek to impose.
HAVIGHURST supra note 4 at 129-130.
The reference to the effect of class on vision, the ability to see or understand
the injustice in the exercise of superior power, whatever its source, has been
described before by other social critics. One of my favorites appears in Book
one of The Forsyte Saga, A Man of Property. Young Jolyan Forsyte is at the
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DISMANTLING DEMOCRACY: THE CONSTRUCTION
OF CONSENT AND THE SILENCING OF DISSENT
Even as deregulation took hold in the United States, there
was still wide spread support for the idea of consumer
protection.77 The rhetoric of deregulation promises the benefits
of competition and reduced costs as various industries are freed
from the costs of regulatory compliance. But there has not been a
To shut up a lion or tiger in confinement was surely a horrible
barbarity. But no cultivated person would admit this.
The idea of its being barbarous to confine wild animals had probably
never occurred to his father, for instance; he belonged to the old
school, who considered it at once humanizing and educational to
confine baboons and panthers, holding the view, no doubt, that in
course of time they might induce these creatures not so unreasonably to
die of misery and heart-sickness against the bars of their cages, and put
the society to the expense of getting others! In his eyes, as in the eyes
of all Forsytes, the pleasure of seeing these beautiful creatures in a state
of captivity far outweighed the inconvenience of imprisonment to beasts
whom God has so improvidently placed in a state of freedom! It was
for the animals' good, removing them at once from the countless
dangers of open air and exercise, and enabling them to exercise their
functions in the guaranteed seclusion of a private compartmentl
Indeed, it was doubtful what wild animals were made for but to be shut
up in cages!
But as young Jolyan had in his constitution the elements of
impartiality, he reflected that to stigmatize as barbarity that which was
merely lack of imagination must be wrong; for none who held these
views had been placed in a similar position to the animals they caged,
and could not, therefore, be expected to enter into their sensations.
JOHN GALSWORTHY, THE FORSYTE SAGA 150 (1950).
77 See Paul N. Bloom and Stephen A. Greyser, The Maturing of Consumerism,
HARV. Bus. REv. 130 Nov./Dec. 1981. The authors discuss the strategies
employed by organizations like the Business Roundtable and American
Enterprise Institute in countering consumerism, transforming the public
discourse and re-characterizing public interest organizations as special interest
groups. But the authors reported that national opinion polls suggested that the
public still felt dissatisfaction with the marketplace. Enthusiasm for
deregulation has dissipated in the areas of energy (electricity), airlines and the
banking industry because of consumer dissatisfaction with both the quality and
the cost of service in each of these areas.
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tidal wave of legislation on the state or federal level dismantling
consumer protection statutes. Generally, administrations hostile
to regulatory oversight do not propose the repeal of consumer
protection statutes, as that would be politically unpopular.
Instead, they are likely to cut funding to regulatory agencies.
Consumers still want and demand accurate and
meaningful information as well as relief when they feel they have
been cheated. In recent years, the battleground shifted from the
legislatures to the courts. State Attorneys General have been
activists in this area bringing suits against the tobacco industry,
the banking industry and the airline industry. And the courts are
not neutral here. Liberal judges run the risk of censure when
they express disgust at the duplicity of corporate officials.
Conservative activists employ discourse and strategies that appear
nuetral, but the rhetoric about efficiency and overcrowding and
litigiousness is nothing more than a thinly veiled disguise for
decisions that protect corporate interests from the expense of
lawsuits and the risk of liability. 8
Judge Frank Easterbrook is in the vanguard of those who
are actively working not just to protect a political minority from
the consequences of the democratic process, but to give that
minority the power to dictate the terms of their legal
relationships.
As Cardozo conceded in Jacob and Youngs, Inc. v. Kent,
there was always the possibility of contracting out of the standard
of reasonableness judicially created, opting for perfection by "apt
and certain words." 79 In other words, the burden of persuasion
and of gaining assent was on the person who wished to depart
from the standard of reasonableness Cardozo described. The
problem at the heart of Gateway and numerous other consumer
transactions is traceable to this assumption that "apt and certain"
words reflect actual bargains or that this assumption applies in
cases of mass production where there is unilateral control over
written instruments accompanying the transaction. What good
78 See the discussion of this rheroic in Casarotto v. Doctor's Associates Inc.,
886 P.2d 931 (1994)(Trieweiler concurring) , rev'd and remanded 517 U.S.
681 (1996)
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are "apt and certain words" if no attempt is made to obtain
actual, meaningful consent to them? For many, what is at stake
in Gateway is a vestigial commitment to consent in contract
theory and doctrine.
There is a tension between the normative standards that
are part of the Code and the provisions that let parties contract
out of those terms. A commitment to an individualistic ethos
should make consent by the other party a prerequisite to such a
change in terms, but often the language that signals the choice to
opt out of communal norms is not "dickered" but boilerplate.
The process by which a relatively larger and more powerful
contracting party imposes its will on those who do business is
part of a much larger problem - a dismantling of democratic
institutions and processes.
s°
The conflict is not between individual liberty and
normative standards that are collective (and therefore coercive).
The conflict is between normative standards that reflect the needs
or desires of consumers and legal rules that deprive them of
public fora in which to express their dissatisfaction with the
behavior of more powerful participants in the marketplace,
8 1
My original hypothesis was that U.C.C. Article 2 is
carefully constructed to express competing values. The
assumption that buyers have a right to expect a minimum
standard of quality with respect to the goods they buy or a
meaningful remedy if the goods are defective is counter balanced
by terms that acknowledge the right of the parties to contract out
'0 When the Contract with America was promoted by Congressional
Republicans, common sense was the byword with respect to "legal reforms."
Generally speaking, "common sense" meant protection for corporate
defendants. It also meant that legal rights and wealth were linked. See Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 which creates a presumption that the
"most adequate plaintiff" will be the person with the "largest financial
interest." 15 U.S.C.A. 77z-1 (a) (3) (B) (iii) (I).
81 In other settings this transfer is more conspicuous and more highly
contested. It has incensed citizens and ignited crusades for campaign finance
reform or for a reduced role for lobbyists at each level of government. The
same sort of political struggle is being waged in connection with the revision
of Article 2 of the U.C.C. Article 2. See Richard E. Speidel, Symposium:
Perspectives on the Uniforn Law Review Process: Revising U. C. C. Article 2:
A View Front The Trenches (forthcoming HASTINGS L.J.)
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of these community standards. The seller can bargain for a term
that absolves him from responsibility for nonperformance or
inadequate performance, but the freedom to contract out of these
terms is limited too by requirements of good faith and
unconscionability, provisions that also reference community
norms. 
82
These doctrines are made necessary because we will not
admit to the absence of bargaining in most consumer
transactions. And these provisions are invoked most often in
cases where there is no real bargaining, when one party has
complete control over any terms that are proposed in writing.
Without such doctrines, what we would see is not a dialectic
between individual and collective values, but a complete transfer
of power over the regime of private ordering to the more
powerful participants in the marketplace.
The Gateway case represents an ideological loggerhead.
It threatens the democratic process on two levels. Not only does
it create a model of contract formation that gives entire control
over the terms of the agreement to one side, it also deprives the
less powerful party, the individual consumer, of the only
mechanism she has to directly confront behavior that is
predatory, abusive or simply overreaching.Whether it is accurate
or not, most individuals still believe that the courts provide
access to justice in a way that membership in the National
Consumers League or a letter to your Congressman does not.
Chief Judge Terry Trieweiler expressed sentiments felt by
many in the face of federalization (by those ideologically
committed in principle to states' rights?) of arbitration. He
documents the costs to individual plaintiffs of arbitration both in
terms of the expenses associated with the process and the distance
82 See e.g. §2-719 (consequential damages cannot be limited or excluded if
that would be unconscionable and limitation in case of personal injury in case
of consumer goods is presumptively unconscionable. Though some consider it
a pyrrhic victory because the plaintiffs were still required to arbitrate, Brower
v. Gateway did acknowledge the unfairness of the original Gateway arbitration
provision. 676 N.Y.S.2d 569. Neither Delaware, Westendorf, 41 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv.2d (Callaghan) 1110 (Del. Ch. 2000), nor Illinois, Filias 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20358 (N.D. III. Jan. 20, 1998), were prepared to hold that
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plaintiffs have to travel to arbitrate. Just as important to anyone
concerned with the morality of law is the fact that the arbitrator
can decide a case without regard for the law or the facts in a
case. There is no predictable outcome, no procedural protection.
I agree with Judge Trieweiler. As they are used most
often today, as a shield for sellers rather than an affordable and
reassonable means of settling disputes, arbitration provisions are
undemocratic. Speaking for the state of Montana, Judge
Trieweiler admonished the federal courts and reminded them of
the basic democratic principles that fuel resistence to arbitration.
It is not irrationality, it is idealism:
We believe in the rule of law so that people can
plan their commercial and personal affairs... We believe
that our courts should be accessible to all, regardless of
their economic status, or their social importance, and
therefore, provide courts at public expense and guarantee
access to everyone... We have contract and tort laws. We
have laws to protect our citizens from bad faith, fraud,
unfair business practices, and oppression by the many
large national corporations who control many aspects of
their lives but with whom they have no bargaining power.
While our system of justice and our rules are imperfect,
they have as their ultimate purpose one overriding
principle. They are intended, and continue to evolve, for
the purpose of providing fairness to people, regardless of
their wealth or political influence. 83
The threat from a single consumer is small. The threat
from consumers acting collectively is significant. As a class,
consumers begin to have the kind of strength or power that
approximates that of big business.84 From the perspective of the
83 Casarotto v. Nick Lombardi and Doctor's Associates, Inc., 886 P.2d 931,
939-940 (Trieweiler concurring in his own opinion for the majority of the
court); rev'd and remanded 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
84 The criticism of class actions comes from both sides, those with the view
that a procedural rule should not transfer power between economic groups.
See John M. Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer
Class Actions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 842
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Gateways of this world, consumers, or the attorneys that
represent them, are something to be feared.85
(1974). More recently there is disappointment and cynicism from those who
believe the potential of the modem class action as an idea whose potential has
been defeated by human frailty, corruption, greed. There is special concern
with the creation of settlement classes. See, e.g. John C. Coffee Jr., The
Corruption of the Class Action: The New Technology of Collusion, 80
CORNELL L. REv. 851 (1995); Susan Koniak, Feasting While the Widow
Weaps: Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc. 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1045 (1995).
85 Compare Judge Cardozo's discussion of human nature discussed supra
note 69 and accompanying text, to that of Judge Friendly. In interpreting the
anti-peonage statutes, 18 U.S.C.A. 1581(a) and 1584, Judge Henry J.
Friendly in United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964) noted that
" Friction over employment punctuated by hotheaded threats (by the
employer) is well known and inevitable." Such threats are not, he believed,
sufficient to overcome the will of an employee. And further, he thought the
relative benefits and risks of interpreting a criminal statute expansively should
be considered:
It goes without saying that if defendant's conduct was what the Oro's
testified and the jury evidently believed, this would have been highly
reprehensible. But before deciding to make such conduct punishable
with up to five years imprisonment, a legislator would wish to weigh
the advantages to society in providing deterrence and retribution
...against the risk that innocent employers might be victimized by
disgruntled emplo yees able to convince prosecutors, and ultimately
juries, of their story ..." (emphasis added)
One my contracts class expressed similai sentiments about employees.
After reading Mary Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc, 472 N.W.2d 268
(1991)(court applied presumption that all offers of employment are at will),
the student argued that the presumption was appropriate. Application of the
"reasonable person" test to the words spoken by the employer or its agents to
the employee would give rise to a flood of litigation by lying employees.
There is a definite class bias in these assumptions, just as there is sexism in
the fear that women will file false claims harassment or rape claims against
men who have spumed their attentions. Fear of people who have always been
subordinate may be a natural reaction when power is transferred, even in the
limited form of a right to seek a remedy for an injury. It is the fear that newly
acquired power will be abused, that the class of individual who receives it
cannot be trusted to use it properly. The distrust is an expression of regret, the
feeling that it is inappropriate for a specific class of people to have power. If
we transfer this methodology to the producer/consumer relationship, it is easy
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There is a public policy in favor of arbitration. 6 But in
court decisions in a variety of jurisdictions there is expressed a
belief that arbitration should not be coerced. Agreement is
required to protect the democratic process. Constructive assent,
manufactured through the manipulation of the rules of contract
formation and the interpretation of silence as assent (because it is
read by the light of the judge's belief that he knows what is best
for the consumer or for the economy), is inappropriate and
undemocratic.
Gateway is a judicial carte blanche. It is not an
acknowledgement by a judge of human imperfection, but an
invitation to misbehave, whether that misbehavior takes the form
of negligence or outright fraud. The notion of reciprocal duty,
the glue that holds us all together, is dissolved.
CONCLUSION
Cases like Gateway are not disputes about
incommensurable values. Sellers seek to avoid the application of
existing legal rules that reflect the mores governing commercial
behavior. This resistence, the existence of a contest, should lead
us to carefully reexamine those mores, but it does not lead
inexorably to the conclusion that the norms should be abandoned.
Judge Easterbrook assumes the guise of someone who is
forward looking, a man who understands what the future
consumers as a form of regret, not because false claims were being filed, but
because the power ceded was perceived to be too great.
Dishonesty is a human failing and it can be found among sellers as well as
buyers. Examples abound from the tobacco industry to the automobile industry
to the most recent case, the tire industry. Bridgestone/Firestone tires that were
ultimately recalled because of tire tread separation, but a Florida Circuit Court
judge's defended her decision to issue protective orders in litigation against
tire companies because she considered it "an important check on aggressive
and increasingly organized plaintiffs' attorneys" she accused of "extortion by
litigation." Thomas A. Fogarty, Can Courts' Cloak of Secrecy Be Deadly?
USA TODAY October 16, 2000.
86 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984)(FAA intended to thwart
state attempts to regulate arbitration) Avedon Engineering Inc. v. The Blason-
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requires. While technology may change, human nature does not
and legal rules govern the relationships between human beings.
Whatever the future has in store, we are not well served by
decisions that abandon "accepted standards of right conduct." S'
We will not be better off with rules that provide incentives for
behavior that injures others, whether the injury is intentional or
not.
As Cardozo instructed in his book on the judicial process:
"The common law does not work from pre-established truths of
universal and inflexible validity to conclusions derived from them
deductively. Its method is inductive, and it draws its
generalizations from particulars. "S Perhaps it is time to revisit
the entire notion of assent in a world of form contracts. The
Hills and those who place orders over the phone should be able
to rely on the existing rules of law with respect to contract
formation including §2-207 if it applies. Given the control that
sellers have over most written contracts and the absence of any
real bargaining, perhaps the best option available to us now is to
allow consumers to dispute and litigate the fairness of particular
tems. Unfortunately, Judge Easterbrook has interpreted contract
law and the Uniform Commercial Code in a way that silences
those who object to the use or abuse of the power to set the terms
of a contract unilaterally.
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